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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The benefits system – particularly Universal Credit (UC) – has played a major role in 
Britain’s COVID-19 response, and it is no surprise that there has been an emphasis on 
how well it has responded. However, there is a political question about whether more 
people should be eligible for benefits per se. This is partly about whether more people 
should be eligible for UC, by amending the household means test (so that people 
are less affected by their partner’s earnings), amending or removing the wealth test, 
or amending the restrictions on access to benefits by migrants. But it is also about 
the role of contributory benefits – ‘new style’ Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and 
Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) – and whether the contributory benefits 
system needs reform.
In this report, we present the findings of exploratory research funded by the Health 
Foundation focusing on people who are ineligible for benefits but who may be in 
financial need.
PEOPLE INELIGIBLE FOR UC
Among people who may have been financially struggling, we estimate that in July–
August 2020 there were:
 ȫ 200,000 people ineligible for UC solely due to their partner’s earnings;
 ȫ 200,000 people ineligible for UC solely due to their savings; and
 ȫ At least 50,000 people ineligible for UC solely due to migration status.
In total, among people who may have been financially struggling, there were 470,000-
480,000 people ineligible for UC for a single reason.
More broadly, we estimate that there were about half a million (480,000–540,000) 
people who had lost 10% or more of their income during the pandemic and may 
have been financially struggling, but were ineligible for both UC and contributory 
benefits (new style JSA). Half of this group overlaps with the three previous groups, 
but half of this group were ineligible for UC for more than one reason.
These are mostly not employees that had completely lost their jobs, but were instead 
primarily people with reduced income/hours (including furlough) or who were self-
employed and not getting enough work. Other than any remaining work-related 
income, many were using savings, but large minorities were relying on friends/family 
or borrowing from a credit card or bank.
Levels of financial strain among most of these groups was relatively high (with the 
exception of those ineligible solely due to savings). Around 40% of each group 
reported severe financial strain, and about 50% of each group reported poor mental 
health. These levels are slightly lower than among successful claimants, but much 
greater than among the general public excluding claimants.
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We estimate that there were 70,000 people [50,000-90,000] recently skipping 
meals where their income fell but they were ineligible for benefits
Many people in these groups had strong feelings about the fairness of being ineligible 
for benefits (if they thought they were ineligible). Among those who may have been 
financially struggling, the majority of those ineligible solely due to their migration 
status felt it was unfair, as did around half of those ineligible solely due to savings or 
partner earnings, or who had experienced an income shock and were ineligible for 
benefits.
UNSUCCESSFUL UC/JSA/ESA CLAIMANTS
We estimate that 290,000 people unsuccessfully tried to claim UC, JSA or 
ESA during the start of the COVID-19 pandemic (and a further 350,000 people 
considered making a claim without beginning an application).
Some of those who had tried and failed to claim were confused about their eligibility, 
were worried about the ‘hassle’ of claiming, or had experienced problems in claiming. 
But it was rare for this to stop them claiming (only 43,000 people). This is surprising 
given the unprecedented increase in claims after lockdown and may be testament to 
the process changes made by the DWP, although we should stress that our survey is 
also likely to have underestimated this group.
The most common reasons people reported for their claims being rejected were 
that they/their partner were still earning too much money (45.4%) or had too much 
in savings (23.9%). Often these were because of people’s partner rather than the 
respondent themselves, again raising issues around the household means test. There 
were also those who never understood why their claim was rejected (12.4%), showing 
the confusion that some people faced in navigating the benefits system.
In the absence of benefit income and often facing sharp income drops, unsuccessful 
claimants used several different ways of getting by financially: most commonly using 
savings, relying on friends/family, or borrowing from a bank/credit card. Yet even so, 
many were struggling financially. Nearly half (46.9%) reported severe financial strain. 
Some (15.2%) had been hungry because they had skipped a meal in the previous two 
weeks, equivalent to 45,000 people. Unsuccessful claimants also had much higher 
levels of mental ill-health than the general population (excluding claimants).
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that among people who may have been financially struggling, there is 
significant financial strain amongst those who are ineligible for benefits (UC and new 
style JSA); much more than amongst the general public, although usually not quite as 
high as among successful claimants. This was particularly amongst those who were 
ineligible for UC due to partner earnings, and amongst those experiencing income 
shocks who were ineligible for both UC and contributory benefits. Many (though not 
all) also felt it was unfair that they were not eligible.
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Given the exploratory nature of this initial research, we do not make specific 
recommendations here about changing eligibility for benefits. These issues may 
require a fundamental redesign of the benefits system, and we need many pieces of 
information to underpin such radical shifts in policy. Alongside our research here, we 
need to consider issues of fairness, economic impacts, modelling of precise policy 
options, and the wider legitimacy of the benefits system. However, we will return 
to consider how to reform the social security system as a whole later in 2021 as our 
Welfare at a (Social) Distance project concludes.
Nonetheless, we do make one specific recommendation here. It is clear that there are 
relatively high levels of need amongst people who apply for benefits but are rejected. 
Irrespective of any changes to eligibility criteria, it should be straightforward for the 
DWP to offer additional guidance when telling people that they are ineligible for 
benefits. This could include information on (i) other benefits that they may be eligible 
for (ideally tailoring this to the information about their situation that they submitted 
when applying); (ii) other sources of financial support that may be available (e.g. from 
the local council); and (iii) other organisations that can provide advice and support 
(e.g. Citizens Advice).
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The benefits system – particularly Universal Credit (UC) – has played a 
major role in Britain’s COVID-19 response, and it is no surprise that there has 
been an emphasis on how well it has responded. Most experts so far have 
suggested that the system has performed well: it has processed a large new 
cohort of benefit claims very quickly, helped by its digital platform, even if 
historic weaknesses of the system remain, particularly around the system of 
advances and general financial adequacy.1 In recent reports from the Welfare 
at a (Social) Distance project,2 we looked in detail at successful claimants’ 
experiences of the benefits system during COVID-193; the organisations 
providing support to those seeking financial assistance during COVID-194; 
and non-take-up of benefits by those who were eligible for them.5
Yet the situation of those who were ineligible for benefits but who may be in financial 
need has been given less attention. In this report, we present the findings of 
exploratory research into this group funded by the Health Foundation.
SHOULD ELIGIBILITY FOR UC BE BROADENED?
Decisions about who should be eligible for UC are fundamentally political. They 
reflect views about the purpose of social security policy and how this can best be 
achieved, balanced against wider impacts including poverty, health and wellbeing; 
public finances; and the wider economy. Here, we were particularly interested in three 
aspects of eligibility that are relevant to social security during COVID-19, but also echo 
more longstanding debates:6
The household means test
Like other means-tested benefits, UC looks at financial need in people’s whole 
household rather than just themselves as an individual (in UC’s case defining this 
as a ‘benefits unit’, which means either single people or married/cohabiting couples, 
plus their dependent children). This means that people who have lost their job will 
sometimes be ineligible for UC if their cohabiting partner is still working and earns 
above a certain level (the exact level depending on their situation).
The household basis for eligibility raises many practical challenges amongst couples,7 
and there has been some public discussion about the fairness of people being 
‘financially punished because [they are] in a relationship’,8 particularly as wider social 
norms emphasise individuality rather than dependence within couples. There has 
also been a concern that the system discourages second earners in a household 
from working.9 While the household means test is integral to UC and indeed means-
tested benefits across the world, it is possible to ‘partially individualise’ means-tested 
benefits so that each individual at least has a work allowance and therefore has a 
financial incentive to work, as occurs in e.g. Australia.10 Moreover, one of the changes 
made in Australia in response to COVID-19 was to temporarily give higher benefit 
payments to people whose partners where working.11
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A related issue is whether benefit payments can be split so that some money goes 
directly to each partner. Currently UC can only be made in a single payment, and 
concerns have been raised about the extent to which this can lead to greater poverty 
or even financial abuse where which money is not shared equally within a couple.12 
Again, this does not have to be the case, with the Australian means-tested benefits 
providing each individual with their own access to payment.13
2. Wealth testing
UC also has a ‘wealth test’ or ‘asset test’: that is, it restricts eligibility based on the 
level of savings held by the claimant and their partner. UC is reduced where people 
have assets above £6,000 (excluding people’s home or pension), and if the couple 
has £16,000 or more, then they have no entitlement to 
UC whatsoever.
One concern with wealth testing is that the limit was set too low. It has not been 
raised since 2006, and if it had been uprated in line with prices then the £16,000 limit 
would now be £23,500.14 A recent report by the Social Security Advisory Committee 
and Institute for Government called for the limit to be raised to £25,000, and for this 
higher level to then be indexed to prices so that it continues to rise appropriately 
each year.15
More broadly, several organisations have called for ‘wealth testing’ for UC to 
be temporarily changed or removed during COVID-19,16 as has occurred in other 
countries such as Australia.17 However, the DWP have strongly argued that wealth 
tests should be maintained.18
3. Migrants and non-UK nationals
Recent years have seen various changes to the circumstances under which migrants 
and non-UK nationals are eligible for benefits.19 Ineligibility partly stems from coming 
to the UK on ‘No Recourse to Public Funds’ visas, which prevents people from 
claiming means-tested benefits like UC (the Migration Observatory at the University 
of Oxford has recently estimated that there are 1.4m people in the UK with No 
Recourse to Public Funds).20 Ineligibility also arises where people struggle to show 
that they meet the benefits systems’ requirements about habitual residency and a 
genuine prospect of work (GPoW), which has been 
a particular problem for EU nationals.
Concerns about migrants’ ineligibility were raised during the initial COVID-19 lockdown, 
because some people faced practical challenges in returning to their country of origin 
so were left ineligible for benefits, but in acute need.21 Indeed, our own research with 
local organisations providing benefits, employment and crisis support demonstrates 
how migrants are some of the worst affected by COVID-19, but also those most 
poorly served through digital or remote platforms, and therefore in urgent need of 
assistance.22
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THE ROLE OF CONTRIBUTORY BENEFITS
Most attention during COVID-19 has been focused on UC, but it is also crucial to 
consider ‘contributory’ benefits; that is, benefits only available to people who have 
paid enough recent National Insurance contributions. Two contributory benefits exist, 
new style Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) and new style Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA), and people who have mostly been in work in the previous two 
years are likely to qualify for them.23 Some people will claim ESA/JSA instead of UC, 
although it is possible for people to claim both simultaneously (with the ESA/JSA 
topped-up by UC).
In one sense, contributory benefits respond to all three of the concerns around 
eligibility raised in the previous section:
 ȫ The household means test: contributory benefits like new style JSA/ESA are based 
on individuals: they look at an individual person’s contributions and income, ignoring 
their partner. People will therefore be eligible to claim new style JSA/ESA even if 
their partner is working.
 ȫ Wealth testing: new style JSA/ESA do not include wealth testing and are available 
to people who are not working irrespective of their savings and other assets.
 ȫ Migrants and non-UK nationals: migrants are eligible for contributory benefits if 
they have paid the required National Insurance contributions, even if they have a 
‘No Recourse to Public Funds’ visa.
However, the current contributory benefits do not resolve these issues for three 
further reasons:
4. Lack of awareness of contributory benefits
There are several signs that awareness of contributory benefits is much lower than 
awareness of UC,24 as we summarised in a recent Welfare at a (Social) Distance 
report.25 Amongst people who had lost a job, the overwhelming majority said that it 
had never occurred to them to claim; and even amongst those who had applied for 
UC and been rejected, the overwhelming majority said that they had not considered 
applying for new style JSA/ESA. Overall, we crudely estimated that 80,000 people 
were probably eligible for new style JSA but did not claim it. Contributory benefits do 
not meaningfully address the eligibility issues above if people are not aware that they 
exist.
5. Financial inadequacy
New style JSA/ESA are also much less generous than UC. They do not include 
certain elements that many claimants are eligible for, e.g. for housing and children,26 
and do not provide ‘passporting’ for people to claim things like free school meals 
and free prescriptions. Even this level of support in JSA/ESA is mostly time-limited 
(e.g. six months for JSA claimants). Moreover, the basic level of new style JSA/ESA 
is currently less generous than UC, because the UC £20 uplift — the increased 
generosity due to COVID-19 — was not extended to new style JSA/ESA. This 
raises issues of fairness; the Social Security Advisory Committee and Institute for 
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Government have recently said that the lower generosity of contributory benefits 
“hardly seems equitable, when those who qualify for contribution-based JSA do so 
precisely because they have directly paid into the system.” 27
6. Providing broader income protection
New style JSA/ESA are flat-rate benefits; everyone in the same situation receives 
the same amount. This is different to the furlough scheme (officially the ‘Coronavirus 
Job Retention Scheme’), which paid people 80% of their previous wages, providing 
them with a broader level of income protection. (The principles behind the Self-
Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) were similar). Those not eligible 
for furlough or SEISS therefore had much less of their income protected during 
COVID-19.28
In fact, the UK is rare amongst high-income countries in not providing similar income 
protection as part of its contributory benefits system. (All the high-income (OECD) 
countries except Finland, Greece, Poland and the USA pay initial unemployment 
benefits at a fixed share of previous wages, at least to some extent.29) As a result, 
while unemployment benefits are low by international standards for all claimants, they 
are particularly low for people who were previously average earners; for example, for 
single people without children among 27 OECD countries, the UK has the 3rd most 
ungenerous unemployment benefit for average earners.30
There is now some discussion about whether there should be a bigger ambition 
for contributory benefits than simply matching the generosity of UC. In the words 
of a recent report from the Social Security Advisory Committee and Institute for 
Government, “Beveridge, in what became the founding document of the UK’s post-
war welfare state, judged that the British people wanted a ‘something for something’ 
system – benefit in return for contributions. That has been progressively eroded. The 
time has come to restore at least an element of that.” 31
IN THIS REPORT
In this report, we discuss the findings of our new exploratory research into people 
ineligible for UC and new style ESA/JSA at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
research is unusual in that it looks at financial struggles and mental health among 
people ineligible for benefits (rather than making arguments about fairness, legitimacy 
or economic issues). Other issues are also important in future discussions about 
benefits eligibility, and we return in the final chapter to set out a framework for these 
discussions going forward.
The research was funded by the Health Foundation, building upon our wider ESRC-
funded Welfare at a (Social) Distance project, and involved two methods:
 ȫ Survey: we conducted an online screening survey of over 170,000 YouGov panel 
members, of whom 2,763 then completed our full survey. The screening survey 
was conducted between the start of May and late July 2020, and the final survey 
was conducted online from the 23rd July to 10th August 2020. Data were weighted 
to account for the proportions of different groups we invited to take part in the 
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follow-up survey, and to be representative of the working-age (18-64) population. 
Further details about this survey can be found in Appendix A, and the anonymised 
dataset is available via the Open Science Foundation.32
 ȫ We mainly focus on people who may have been financially struggling - that 
is, they were on low-to-middle incomes, and didn’t say they were comfortable 
financially or that their income hadn’t changed in lockdown.
 ȫ We focus on non-claimants of UC, ESA and JSA (we also exclude Tax Credit 
claimants 33). We compare these non-claimants to two other groups:
 » Benefit claimants, using our survey of 7,497 UC, ESA, JSA and Tax Credit 
claimants, conducted 21st May to 15th June 2020
 » The general public, using (i) a YouGov survey of 6,000 working-age people 
conducted May 6-11th for the Resolution Foundation (also funded by the Health 
Foundation); and (ii) a YouGov survey of 1,600 working-age people conducted 
May 21st -June 15th for the Welfare at a (Social) Distance project.
 ȫ Interviews: we conducted 21 in-depth interviews with non-claimants during August 
and September 2020. To help facilitate this rapid research, participants were 
contacted via a research participant recruitment agency (Acumen), aiming for 4-6 
people within each of the four main quota groups of the survey (see Appendix 
A). The interviews allow us to better interpret the survey findings, and to examine 
the experiences of non-claimants in greater detail. (All interviewees were given 
pseudonyms.)
We would like to thank the Resolution Foundation for their help with two parts of this 
research.34
Our findings are organised into two chapters: (1) Ineligible claimants; and (2) 
Unsuccessful claimants (that is, those ineligible claimants who applied but were 
rejected.)
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1. PEOPLE INELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS
In this chapter, we look at two sets of people ineligible for benefits (and 
who may have been financially struggling35) who are of particular policy 
interest given the issues raised in the Introduction. Firstly, we look at 
people ineligible for UC for a single reason, to show the situation of people 
who would become eligible for UC if a single aspect of policy was changed. 
Secondly, we look more broadly at people who have had an income shock but 
who are ineligible for both UC and JSA (we are unable to estimate eligibility 
for ESA due to the challenges in replicating benefits disability assessments 
within a survey). The chapter begins by outlining each group in more detail, 
before looking at their financial situation and mental health.
To enable this analysis, we estimated all of our survey respondents’ eligibility for UC 
and new style JSA (see Appendices B and C). These estimates depend on a number 
of decisions about how to fit people’s survey responses into benefits system criteria, 
particularly when respondents are unsure about their/their partner’s income and 
savings. To make this more transparent, we have estimated both a minimum and 
maximum UC eligibility that differ in the assumptions about respondents’ income/
savings when they only report a range; respondents’ uncertainty about whether 
earnings were gross or net; and for unknown levels of savings (see Appendix B for 
details).
Still, estimating eligibility for UC and contributory benefits are both challenging, and 
have never previously been attempted (even if take-up estimates for other, simpler 
benefits have been common in the UK). Conducting such estimates is therefore 
complex and requires a number of caveats. Our UC eligibility estimates are subject 
to some uncertainty, particularly where people’s income was volatile and does not 
consistently fall into the monthly UC income assessment periods. Our JSA eligibility 
estimates are subject to even greater levels of uncertainty, given that we have not 
attempted to capture people’s history of National Insurance contributions, and as a 
result they underpin fewer analyses in this chapter. While the results below should 
be interpreted with these caveats in mind, we hope that they contribute to current 
debates about benefits eligibility, as well as prompting future research that reduces 
some of these uncertainties.
1.1 PEOPLE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR UC FOR A SINGLE REASON
In this section we look at those who were ineligible for UC because of one reason 
only: partner earnings, savings and migration status. In each case, there have been 
calls to make some/all of the group eligible for benefits, and defining these groups 
enables us (in the rest of the chapter) to examine the extent to which these groups 
were struggling financially.
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1. Partner earnings only
Among those who may have been financially struggling, we estimate that 
200,000-220,000 people [95% confidence interval 160,000–260,000] were ineligible for 
UC solely because of their partner’s earnings: about 0.5% of the working-age 
population.36 (As explained above, the range in the central estimate is because we run 
our UC eligibility model twice, once making assumptions that lead to a minimum UC 
eligibility, and once estimating a maximum UC eligibility; see Appendix B). Note that 
these estimates remove a person’s partner and their earnings from the household, so 
the reduction in earned income is partially offset by the reduced entitlement from only 
having one adult in the household.
This excludes people who were ineligible for UC because of their partner’s assets, as 
we cannot split household assets by partner. However, in a previous report we found 
that 8.9% [5.8 to 13.2%] of people rejected from UC said that this was because of their 
partner’s savings.37
2. Savings only
Among those who may have been financially struggling, we estimate that 
210,000-220,000 people [170,000–270,000] were ineligible for UC solely because of 
their savings/assets: about 0.5% of the working-age population. These are mostly 
people who have at least £16,000 of savings, although a small number (about 2%) 
had savings of £12,000–£16,000, which led to a small UC entitlement being eroded to 
nothing.
Of the people telling us about their assets in detail,38 more than one in three had 
savings of £16,000–£30,000, while 60% had savings of more than £30,000. This 
suggests that about 80,000 people would have been eligible for UC if the wealth test 
limit was raised from £16,000 to £30,000. However, we have too few respondents 
to focus only on those who were ineligible for UC because of savings/assets in the 
£16,000-£30,000 range, so in this chapter we focus on the broader group of people 
ineligible solely because of savings of any amount.
3. Migration status only
Finally, we look at people who are ineligible solely because of their migration status. 
In our screening survey of 170,000 people, we asked people if they had applied for 
benefits since the start of COVID-19, and if not, why not. Relatively small numbers 
said they were not eligible for benefits ‘due to my immigration status’, and we went 
back to 260 of them for our follow-up survey. However, not all of these people then 
repeated that they had any migration-related reasons for their ineligibility.39 Of those 
who did, some were also ineligible for other reasons (e.g. earnings or savings). This 
leaves only 67 respondents who are ineligible solely due to their migration status, 
which means that there is considerable uncertainty around our estimates for this 
group (as shown by the confidence intervals).
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Readers should also note that YouGov have explicitly stated that their surveys 
often under-represent migrants, particularly non-English-speaking, first-generation 
migrants. Nevertheless, it is still valuable to look at the situation of migrants in this 
exploratory research. They are a group that experts, politicians and charities have 
raised particular concerns about during COVID-19.They are also a group that are 
seldom heard in social surveys, because of a range of barriers that make it difficult 
for researchers to reach them (including language and both physical and digital 
access). These barriers were even harder to overcome during COVID-19, where the 
impossibility of face-to-face research required researchers to use online panels, which 
suffer from exactly the same problems as the YouGov panel. Despite the issues 
around this data, it is important to look at migrants in this report.
Acknowledging the above caveats, we estimate that at least 50,000–60,000 
people [30,000-80,000] were ineligible for UC solely because of their migration status: 
about 0.1% of the working-age population. Around half of these people were 
students,40 and overwhelmingly these are people who have not applied for benefits, 
rather than those who have applied and been rejected. But we should stress that the 
true figures are likely to be higher.
Overall, we estimate that among those who may have been financially struggling, 
there were 470,000–480,000 people [410,000-540,000] who were ineligible for UC for 
a single reason.
1.2 LOOKING AT BROADER INELIGIBILITY FOR UC AND JSA
The second way that we look at ineligibility in this report is to look beyond specific  
UC issues and instead look at people who have had an income shock who are 
ineligible for benefits. To understand the analyses that follows, readers should be 
aware of the following:
 ȫ By ‘income shock’, we mean a sudden sharp drop in household income. This is 
not meant to suggest that income shocks should be a direct criteria for benefits 
eligibility, particularly not at the household level. Instead, looking at people suffering 
income shocks allows us to create a crude group of people who might be struggling 
financially for a variety of reasons, each of which could lead to benefits eligibility 
in a reformed system (we look at the explanations for these income shocks in the 
following section).
 ȫ Our precise definition of ‘income shock’ is a 10% or greater drop in household 
income since before COVID-19 (i.e. between February 2020 and July/August 
2020). We also briefly look at the numbers who have seen 25% or greater drops in 
income: fewer people will meet this stricter definition of an ‘income shock’ and they 
will have greater levels of financial strain.
 ȫ Due to the design of our survey, we exclude people with moderate-to-high-
incomes41 and who said they simply did not need benefits.42 This will both reduce 
the number of people in our ‘income shock’ group and increase the average level of 
financial strain among people within it.
Welfare at a Social Distance 
Project Report
13
 ȫ Unlike the previous section, we here look at people who were ineligible for UC for 
any number of different reasons and also look at people ineligible for new style JSA. 
This is because the previous section was focused on specific UC eligibility debates, 
but here we are concerned with the broader question: how many people are 
struggling financially who are currently ineligible for support by the benefits system?
On this definition, we estimate that there were at least43 480,000–540,000 people 
[420,000-610,000] who had suffered an income shock during the pandemic and who 
may have been financially struggling but were ineligible for benefits (UC or new 
style JSA). This is equivalent to 1.2%–1.3% of the working-age population who had 
lost at least 10% of their household income at the start of the pandemic and who 
may have been financially struggling, but who were not eligible for benefits. There is 
obviously considerable variation within this group: some people’s income had fallen 
by 10%, but 200,000–220,000 people [170,000-260,000] had seen more severe income 
shocks of 25% or more of their household income.
This group partially overlaps with the groups ineligible for UC for a single reason: 3% 
[2–5%] were ineligible solely due to migration status; 23% [18–28%] solely due to partner 
earnings; and 23% [19-27%] solely due to savings. But about half (51% [46–57%]) were 
ineligible for UC due to a combination of these reasons and/or their own earnings.
1.3 WERE THESE EMPLOYEES WHO HAD LOST THEIR JOB?
To avoid misunderstandings, we should stress that relatively few of the people in 
these groups were employees who had lost their job completely. Instead, nearly 
everyone had seen work-related earnings fall for a variety of different reasons, as 
shown in Figure 1, below. The most common form of this for all groups was that their 
income/hours of work were reduced (including via furlough), but the balance of 
these differed across the different groups:
 ȫ Those who were ineligible solely due to partner earnings or ineligible and having an 
income shock were very likely to have had reduced income/hours (over 70% in 
each case);
 ȫ Those who were ineligible solely due to their migration status were less likely to see 
reduced income/hours (32.7%), but particularly likely to have lost their job (30.9%);
 ȫ Those who were ineligible solely due to savings were also less likely to have reduced 
income/hours (32.7%), and were more likely to be self-employed and not have 
enough work (35.5%).
Putting these together, those ineligible solely due to partner earnings or ineligible and 
having an income shock were overwhelmingly likely to have experienced one of these 
changes in employment (81.4% [74.0 to 87.1%] of those ineligible due to partner earnings, 
and 89.3% [85.8 to 92.0%] of those ineligible and seeing an income shock). But even in 
the other groups of people ineligible for UC, over 60% had experienced one of these 
reasons for reduced work-related earnings.
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Figure 1: Changes in employment since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic
Note: all groups refer to people who may have been financially struggling. Within this, ‘i all 
groups refer to people who may have been financially struggling. Within this, ‘ineligible due to 
partner earnings’ refers to people who are ineligible solely ineligible for UC because of their 
partner earnings (and not own earnings, savings or migration status). Ineligible + income shock 
refers to people who were ineligible for both UC and new style JSA, who had seen at least a 
10% drop in household income since before COVID-19. 
Source: WASD/YouGov survey of non-claimants, July-Aug 2020. Sample size is 186 ineligible 
due to partner earnings, 235 ineligible due to savings, 67 ineligible due to migration status, and 
498 ineligible + income shock.
The first three groups were defined by being eligible for UC but ignoring our crude 
estimated eligibility for JSA. Nevertheless, because relatively small numbers of these 
groups had lost their jobs completely, it should be no surprise that relatively few 
would have been eligible for new style JSA: we estimate that only 4% [2–7%] of those 
ineligible for UC solely due to their partner, 8% [5-13%] of those ineligible solely due to 
savings, and 9% [4–19%] of those ineligible solely due to their migration status would 
probably have been eligible for new style JSA. As we have stressed, our JSA eligibility 
estimates are relatively crude, but even if we estimate JSA eligibility more broadly 
(including anyone working as an employee in the previous six months and not working 
now), then less than 15% of each of these groups was eligible for new style JSA.  
(The income shock group by definition excludes people who would probably have 
been eligible for new style JSA).
1.4 FINANCIAL STRUGGLES AND MENTAL HEALTH DIFFICULTIES
Aside from any work-related income, these groups were also using a range of other 
ways of managing financially, as shown in Figure 2. Unsurprisingly, a large majority of 
those ineligible for UC solely due to savings were relying on their savings (71.4%) and 
were less likely to have to use other strategies. Amongst the other groups, many were 
using (often more limited levels of) savings too, but they were also more likely to be 
using other ways of getting by: over 20% of those who had an income shock or who 
were ineligible solely due to partner earnings were relying on friends/family, rising to 
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over 30% of those ineligible solely due to their migration status. Over 20% of those 
who had an income shock or who were ineligible solely due to partner earnings were 
using borrowing from a credit card or bank.
Only small numbers of each group were using food banks or other emergency 
support (not shown in the figure): about 1%–2% in each case, far lower than among 
successful claimants (among whom 7.0% were using food banks and 3.8% using 
other forms of emergency support).
Figure 2: Things that people are doing to get by financially at the present time
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Note: ‘Ineligible due to partner earnings’ refers to people who are ineligible solely ineligible for UC 
because of their partner earnings (and not own earnings, savings or migration status). Ineligible 
+ income shock refers to people who were ineligible for both UC and new style JSA, who had 
seen at least a 10% drop in household income since before COVID-19. 
Source: WASD/YouGov survey of non-claimants, July-Aug 2020. Sample size is 186 ineligible 
due to partner earnings, 235 ineligible due to savings, 67 ineligible due to migration status, and 
498 ineligible + income shock.
Levels of financial strain amongst these groups are shown in Figure 3. It is interesting 
to note that those who were ineligible for UC solely because of savings had relatively 
lower levels of financial strain, though still consistently higher than among the general 
public. Amongst the other groups, financial strain was much higher – around 40% 
reported severe financial strain (falling behind on housing costs or other bills/debts, 
or not being able to afford daily fresh fruit and vegetables). These levels are slightly 
lower than among successful claimants (48% of whom reported this type of financial 
strain), but much greater than among the general public excluding claimants (13%).
The most severe indicator of financial strain that we investigate is recent hunger: not 
eating when hungry at some point in the previous two weeks because they could not 
afford food. For all of the groups of people ineligible for UC solely because of a single 
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reason, hunger is much higher than amongst the general public (7%–11% in those 
ineligible for UC vs. 2% in the general public excluding claimants).
Figure 3: Financial strain among those who were ineligible for benefits
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Notes: ‘Severe financial strain’ refers to those that report any of (i) can’t keep up with bills/
regular debt payments, fallen behind with part of/all housing costs, or can’t afford to eat fresh 
fruit and vegetables daily. 
Sample size is 186 ineligible due to partner earnings, 235 ineligible due to savings, 67 ineligible 
due to migration status, and 498 ineligible + income shock (all from the WASD/YouGov survey 
of non-claimants, July-Aug 2020) /// 4,786 members of the general public excluding existing 
benefit claimants (Resolution Foundation/YouGov survey of the general public, May 2020) 
except for ‘not eating when hungry’, where sample size is 1,429 (WASD/YouGov survey of the 
general public, May-June 2020) /// 7,483 successful benefit claimants (WASD/YouGov survey 
of successful claimants, May-June 2020). ‘Benefit claimants’ here refers to UC, all forms of 
JSA/ESA, and Tax Credits.
The highest rates44 of hunger, however, are amongst those who were ineligible, 
may have been financially struggling and who had an income shock: 15% of whom 
report recent hunger (more than six times as many as the general public excluding 
claimants). This is equivalent to 70,000 people [50,000–90,000] recently skipping 
meals where their income fell but they were ineligible for benefits.
Finally, in Figure 4 we show levels of mental ill-health among people ineligible for UC. 
Again, we find that the position of those ineligible solely due to their savings is better 
than among the other ineligible groups. However, all of the other groups of people 
ineligible for benefits see noticeably higher levels of mental ill-health and anxiety 
than the general public (again, levels of uncertainty are quite wide and we cannot be 
confident about the differences between the different groups of people ineligible for 
benefits).
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Figure 4: Mental ill-health among those who were ineligible for benefits
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Sample size is 186 ineligible due to partner earnings, 235 ineligible due to savings, 67 ineligible 
due to migration status, and 498 ineligible + income shock (all from the WASD/YouGov survey 
of non-claimants, July-Aug 2020) /// 4,786 members of the general public excluding existing 
benefit claimants (Resolution Foundation/YouGov survey of the general public, May 2020) /// 
7,483 successful benefit claimants (WASD/YouGov survey of successful claimants, May-June 
2020). ‘Benefit claimants’ here refers to UC, all forms of JSA/ESA, and Tax Credits.
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1.5 DID PEOPLE THINK THEIR INELIGIBILITY FOR UC WAS UNFAIR?
Finally, although we have mostly focused on the financial situation and mental health 
of people who were ineligible for benefits, we also asked them if they felt it was 
unfair that they were not eligible for UC;45 the results are shown in Table 1. A majority 
of those ineligible for UC solely due to their migration status felt it was unfair, as did 
around half of those ineligible solely due to savings or partner earnings, or who had 
seen a sharp income drop and who were ineligible.46
Table 1: Perceived fairness of not being eligible for benefits
Agrees that unfair 
that ineligible
Estimate 95% CI
Ineligible solely due to migration status 60.8% [47.3 to 72.8%]
Ineligible solely due to savings 49.3% [41.2 to 57.4%]
Ineligible solely due to partner earnings 46.6% [37.3 to 56.2%]
Ineligible & sharp income drop 45.8% [40.3 to 51.4%]
Respondents were given the option of choosing six answer categories: Strongly agree // Agree 
// Neither agree nor disagree // Disagree // Strongly disagree // Don’t know. The table shows 
the percentage (strongly) agreeing (vs. (strongly) disagreeing, neither agreeing nor disagreeing, 
or saying ‘don’t know’). Sample sizes are 61, 212, 164, and 468 respectively. Source is the WASD/
YouGov survey of non-claimants, July-Aug 2020.
In our interviews, several people felt frustrated at their ineligibility for UC (if they 
thought they were ineligible), which was expressed in various ways. For some, it was 
frustration that their partner’s income or savings meant they themselves were not 
eligible for benefits, even if they were the ones who had lost their job. For others, it 
was frustration at the perceived inequitable spending by policy makers during the 
pandemic:
“Well, do you know, my feelings as I’ve been sitting watching television 
almost nightly and hearing various ministers who are pledging billions of 
pounds for various areas within the community and within society – all 
of whom I agree need some help, I completely agree with that. Then, I’m 
questioning, if you can find billions of pounds to help these sectors why 
can’t we have some benefit from that?” (Mandy, 50–65)




This chapter focuses on ‘unsuccessful claimants’: that is, those that started 
a claim for benefits, but did not ultimately receive them. This includes people 
who may have reached one of the following stages:
 ȫ Started but not submitted an application.
 ȫ Submitted but never completed: some people will have completed their initial 
application form but will not have done the further steps necessary to complete 
their application in full. For example, if claimants had not verified their identity online, 
then they needed to verify their identity by phone instead (the claim may never be 
completed if they do not,1) or if they decided to withdraw their claim during the 
telephone verification conversation. Before COVID-19, claimants were also required 
to attend an interview at Jobcentre Plus and complete their Claimant Commitment 
(though both of these requirements were switched-off during the pandemic). There 
will be much variation here: claimants may decide not to complete their application 
before or after having spoken to DWP staff, some may formally withdraw, while 
others will simply abandon their application;
 ȫ Rejected: some people will have completed their application and have been rejected 
because they are not eligible for the benefit they applied for.
We looked in detail at unsuccessful claimants in an earlier report,47 but here extend 
the quantitative and qualitative analyses slightly and relate this to the analysis of 
people ineligible for benefits more broadly in the previous chapter.
2.1 HOW MANY UNSUCCESSFUL CLAIMANTS ARE THERE?
We estimate that 290,000 people [250,000–330,000] unsuccessfully tried to claim 
UC, JSA or ESA at the start of COVID-1948: equivalent to 0.7% of the working-
age population. In our earlier report, we discuss the likely accuracy of our estimates 
in detail, comparing them to other surveys and the DWP’s administrative data. We 
conclude that our figures are more likely to be accurate than other surveys but may 
be a slight underestimate of the true figure.
There is some overlap between unsuccessful claimants (particularly rejected 
claimants) and people ineligible for benefits (who we considered in the previous 
chapter), although this overlap is relatively small. Unsuccessful claimants account 
for 15%–20% of each of the groups that we looked at in the previous chapter (people 
ineligible solely due to savings or partner earnings, and people who had seen an 
income shock who were ineligible). The one exception is people ineligible solely 
due to migration status, only 8% of whom had started making an application for 
UC/JSA/ESA.
These unsuccessful claimants are mostly people who applied and were rejected 
as they were not eligible (230,000 people [190,000–260,000]), with smaller numbers 
withdrawing their claims due to frustration or perceived ineligibility (33,000 
1  DWP have a process in place where they try to contact people that they haven’t heard from after a certain time, but if they 
never hear back from someone, then eventually they close the claim. Welfare at a Social Distance 
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[23,000-42,000]) or never completing their application (43,000 people [31,000–55,000]). 
We now explore each of these groups in turn.
How close had people come to claiming?
It is easy to think that there is a simple and clear divide between those who claimed 
and those who did not. In practice, however, the situation is more complex. Firstly, 
people could make an application even if they were not sure they would be eligible, 
and even if they thought they might withdraw their application before receiving 
the benefit. This could happen if they were trying to access other forms of support, 
but without a clear idea what they would get or how long it would take, and they 
therefore considered claiming benefits as a ‘fall back’ option. This was the case for 
several people we spoke to who were self-employed and looked into small business 
grants or SEISS. As Steve said:
“If it turned out that I could access money through some other source, 
I could always tell Universal Credit and halt the claim, so I thought it’d 
be better to get into the queue to begin with.” (Steve, 50–65)
Many people had also considered making a claim, even if they never actually 
started the application. We estimate that 350,000 people [300,000–400,000] 
considered making a claim without beginning an application.
2.2 WHY HAD PEOPLE’S APPLICATIONS FOR BENEFITS BEEN 
UNSUCCESSFUL?
Understanding failures to complete the application
We estimate that only 43,000 people [31,000–55,000] failed to complete their 
application for benefits. This is a surprisingly small number given the unprecedented 
increase in claims after lockdown, on top of the pre-existing challenges associated 
with the rollout of UC (see Introduction). This may partly reflect three factors:
 ȫ The greater digital literacy of the new cohort of benefit claimants;
 ȫ That online surveys such as ours under-represent people with weaker digital literacy; 
and
 ȫ The process changes made by the DWP, which successfully avoided a large number 
of people missing out on benefits due to process issues.
Our existing research suggests that the switch to remote support has meant some 
would-be claimants that previously relied on face-to-face assistance are currently 
out of reach and therefore at risk of not receiving the assistance they need to initiate 
or sustain a claim, with many support agencies worried that some people are falling 
through the cracks in support.49 Similarly, some of the people we spoke to had 
started and then abandoned a claim for benefits because they found the process too 
confusing. For example, Tom had struggled with the online application form:
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“I was never really getting answers of anything valuable. It just kept giving 
me more and more questionnaires to answer, so I gave up in the end.” 
(Tom, 18–35)
Similarly, we found confusion about eligibility even amongst those who completed an 
application and were found to be ineligible.50 Ezekiel (30–49) was rejected because 
of his partner’s income but criticised the complexity of the process despite being 
an IT specialist himself. He found it particularly difficult to provide data on pensions, 
profit from savings/business, and family members helping you or giving you money.
We focused on Helen (30–49)’s similar situation in a previous report.51 After 
exploring her options and finding herself ineligible for a business loan/grant, Helen 
phoned the UC helpline as she wanted to speak to someone about her eligibility. 
However, she described a number of frustrating and time-consuming attempts to 
speak to anyone, eventually giving up and deciding to just try to apply online:
“So this phone call must have gone on for, I’d say probably an hour to an hour-and-
a-half, every single day, working day, for eight days. That’s when I decided, I can’t do 
this any longer, it’s not happening. So, I tried to go online and apply online.”
Yet the online process proved extremely confusing for Helen. Her self-employed 
status seemed to lead to a series of ‘dead ends’ in the application:
“If I was a layman and I’d come out of Tesco and they’d finished me, that 
was dead obvious. With self-employment, it didn’t give me any options to 
say the self-employment has gone. It was too confusing.”
Frustrated, she next tried calling a benefits helpline and HMRC without success. At 
this point she gave up her application without completing it: “I was completely at a 
dead-end.”
In other words, confusion about eligibility and ‘hassle’ in claiming were found not only 
among those who did not submit a claim (as found in the previous chapter), but also 
among some of those who had tried to claim, and at extremes this could prevent 
people from claiming.
Overall, though, it seems likely that the numbers of people who tried and failed to 
complete a claim were relatively low. However, we should emphasise that these 
figures are likely to be underestimates, because online YouGov surveys may miss out 
the very people that are likely to struggle with the process of applying online.
Understanding withdrawal due to frustration or perceived eligibility
We estimate that 32,000 people [23,000–41,000] made a claim that they 
subsequently withdrew due to frustration or perceived ineligibility. These are people 
who did not say that they withdrew because they did not need benefits any more,52 
instead saying (i) they thought that their application would be rejected, (ii) they 
realised how little they would receive, or (iii) they got too frustrated and gave up.
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Steve (50–65) is an example of this group. He says that “as I got further and further 
into [the application], I just found questions that I couldn’t answer. Not because I 
didn’t particularly understand them, but they were just asking for information that 
I couldn’t give them” (e.g. about his children’s income). He did eventually submit 
the application, but it was returned with a request for more information. Feeling 
overwhelmed, fearful of getting ‘too stressed’, and with the option of living on his 
savings/freelance work, he “just thought, I don’t need this money that badly”:
“I do remember I’d got to a place where I thought, ‘do you know what, I’m 
not going to bother with this. I’ll live on my savings. This hopefully isn’t 
going to last more than a couple of months and I’ll live on that.’” 
(Steve, 50–65)
Since Steve’s interview, however, we have experienced further national lockdowns 
and a complex tier system that impacts disproportionately on particular sectors 
of the economy and particular regions of the UK. Some people that withdrew 
their applications may therefore have since reapplied, as the duration of COVID-19 
became clear.53
Understanding rejected applications
The largest group of unsuccessful claimants are those who applied for benefits 
but were rejected because they did not meet the eligibility criteria (230,000 people 
[190,000–260,000]). Some never understood why their claim was rejected (12.4% 
[9.3 to 16.3%]). However, most were able to give one or more reasons, and these are 
shown in Table 2 below. The most common reasons were that the respondent or their 
partner were still earning too much money (45.4% [40.0 to 50.9%]), even after the drop 
in income that most had seen (see below). Following this were those whose claims 
were rejected because they or their partner had too much in savings (23.9% [19.7 to 
28.6%]).
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Table 2: Reasons why benefit claims were rejected
Why claim was rejected 
(95% confidence interval)
Respondent or partner earnings 45.4% [40.0 to 50.9%]
Respondent earnings 17.5% [13.8 to 22.0%]
Partner earnings 41.6% [35.2 to 48.3%]
Respondent or partner savings 23.9% [19.7 to 28.6%]
Respondent savings 20.1% [16.3 to 24.6%]
Partner savings 8.9% [5.9 to 13.2%]
Other income 7.0% [5.0 to 9.7%]
National Insurance contributions1 7.2% [5.1 to 10.1%]
Other reasons2 10.5% [7.5 to 14.4%]
Never explained why I was ineligible 12.4% [9.3 to 16.3%]
Note: multiple reasons possible, hence these do not total 100%. 1 National Insurance 
contributions refer to ESA and JSA only, but the percentage shown is as a share of all rejected 
claimants. 2 Other reasons include No Recourse to Public Funds, not being to establish habitual 
residence (both covered in more detail in the following chapter), full-time students, and those 
who said ‘other’. Source/sample size: n=488 people whose claims were rejected, from the 
YouGov follow-up survey of non-claimants.
A number of other reasons were also given, although each of these were less 
common. Some unsuccessful JSA/ESA claimants (19% [13-28%]) did not have 
sufficient National Insurance contributions. Others were ineligible because they were 
full-time students (2.4% [1.1 to 5.3%]) or for reasons relating to their migration status, 
as discussed previously.
2.3 FINANCIAL STRUGGLES AND MENTAL HEALTH DIFFICULTIES
In our earlier report,54 we showed that many unsuccessful claimants had seen sharp 
declines in their income: indeed, this was even more common than amongst those 
not taking up benefits above. At the time we spoke to them in July 2020, nearly half 
(46.1%) of unsuccessful claimants were relying on savings to get by financially, as 
shown in Figure 5. Others were relying on borrowing or gifts from friends/family 
(30.1% relied on friends/family in one form or another), and over a quarter (26.8%) 
were borrowing from banks/credit cards.
Unsuccessful claimants relied on all of these far more than the general public 
(excluding claimants)and were also relying on credit cards/bank loans more than 
successful claimants. Although rare, unsuccessful claimants were also more likely 
to be relying on food banks (4.2% [2.4 to 7.4%]) than the general public (excluding 
claimants; 0.6% [0.4 to 0.8%], although successful claimants were even more likely 
to be using them; 7.0% ([6.3 to 7.7%]).
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Figure 5: How unsuccessful claimants were getting by financially  
at the present time
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Sample size is 628 unsuccessful claimants (WASD/YouGov survey of non-claimants, July-Aug 
2020) /// 4,786 members of the general public excluding existing UC, all JSA/ESA and Tax 
Credit claimants (Resolution Foundation/YouGov survey of the general public, May 2020) 
except for ‘not eating when hungry’, where sample size is 1,429 (WASD/YouGov survey of the 
general public, May-June 2020) /// 2,601 successful new UC claimants (WASD/YouGov survey 
of successful claimants, May-June 2020).
Financial strain amongst unsuccessful claimants was similar to that of new UC 
claimants, as shown in Figure 6. Simply put, financial strain was not an uncommon 
experience for unsuccessful claimants: 21.9% had fallen behind on their housing 
costs, 27.4% couldn’t keep up with bills/regular debts, and 28.1% couldn’t afford to 
eat fresh fruit and veg daily. In total, nearly half of unsuccessful claimants (46.9%) 
had experienced one of these financial strains.
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Figure 6: Financial strain amongst unsuccessful claimants
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Sample size is 628 unsuccessful claimants (WASD/YouGov survey of non-claimants, July-Aug 
2020) /// 4,786 members of the general public excluding existing UC, all JSA/ESA and Tax 
Credit claimants (Resolution Foundation/YouGov survey of the general public, May 2020) 
except for ‘not eating when hungry’, where sample size is 1,429 (WASD/YouGov survey of the 
general public, May-June 2020) /// 2,601 successful new UC claimants (WASD/YouGov survey 
of successful claimants, May-June 2020).
Most acutely, 15.2% [12.2 to 18.8%] had been hungry because they had skipped a meal 
in the previous two weeks. This is equivalent to 45,000 [35,000–55,000] unsuccessful 
claimants who skipped a meal in the previous two weeks because they could not 
afford food.
Finally, we looked at mental health amongst unsuccessful claimants, using the same 
methods that we described above (summarised in Figure 4). As shown in Figure 7, 
both anxiety and a broader measure of mental ill-health were much higher amongst 
unsuccessful claimants than the general public: unsuccessful claimants were 12.7% 
more likely to have high anxiety and 25.8% more likely to have poor mental health.
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Figure 7: Mental ill-health in unsuccessful claimants
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Sample size is 628 unsuccessful claimants (WASD/YouGov survey of non-claimants, July-Aug 
2020) /// 4,786 members of the general public excluding existing UC, all JSA/ESA and Tax 
Credit claimants (Resolution Foundation/YouGov survey of the general public, May 2020).




This report has presented the findings of exploratory research focusing on 
people who are ineligible for benefits but who may be in financial need. In 
this report, we have shown that there is significant financial strain among 
those who were ineligible for benefits (UC and new style JSA): much 
more than among the general public (although usually not quite as high as 
amongst successful claimants). This financial strain was particularly acute 
amongst those ineligible for UC due to partner earnings, and amongst those 
experiencing income shocks who were ineligible for UC and contributory 
benefits. Many (though not all) felt that it was unfair that they were not 
eligible.
Given the exploratory nature of this initial research, we do not make specific 
recommendations about changing eligibility for benefits here, because these issues 
may require a fundamental redesign of the benefits system, and we need many pieces 
of information to underpin such radical shifts in policy. Alongside this, we need to 
consider:
 ȫ Fairness: many of the arguments for extending UC eligibility and/or expanding the 
role of contributory benefits rest on considerations of fairness (see Introduction). 
This includes whether it is fair or unfair to penalise people who save, or who are 
cohabiting in a relationship, or who have migrated to the UK.
 ȫ Modelling: precise policy options need to be run through tax-benefit simulation 
models, to see the exact number of people affected and the total cost to 
government.
 ȫ Economic impacts: the benefits system has an important macro-economic 
function. As a recent report by the Social Security Advisory Committee and Institute 
for Government states, “When big macro-economic shocks happen… contributory 
benefits provide a stronger buffer against the drop in income that job loss entails… 
[Contributory benefits are] also good for the economy when abnormal shocks such 
as the pandemic occur – with more people in better-paid jobs suddenly losing them 
– because people are likely to reduce short-term expenditure by less than would be 
the case if they relied purely on means-tested benefits.” 55
 ȫ Legitimacy: it has long been argued that means-tested systems are unavoidably 
stigmatising, creating limited public support for increasing the level of benefits that 
claimants receive (for wide-ranging reasons56). Indeed, in other research we have 
found that even during COVID-19, some people who were eligible for UC did not 
apply for it, explicitly saying that this was because they felt it was stigmatising.57 
Any consideration of the future direction of the benefits system cannot avoid 
thinking about public legitimacy.
We will return to these issues and a more detailed examination of the future of the 
benefits system later in 2021 as our Welfare at a (Social) Distance project concludes.
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Our intention with this report is to contribute to this rapidly developing debate by 
drawing attention to the levels of financial need among those ineligible for benefits. 
However, our analysis here does enable us to make one key recommendation. It is 
clear that there were relatively high levels of need amongst people who applied for 
benefits but were rejected. Irrespective of any changes to eligibility criteria, it should 
be straightforward for the DWP to offer additional guidance when informing people 
that they are ineligible for benefits. This could include information on (i) other benefits 
that they may be eligible for (ideally tailoring this to the information about their 
situation that they submitted when applying); (ii) other sources of financial support 
that may be available (e.g. from their local council); and (iii) other organisations that 
can provide advice and support (e.g. Citizens Advice).
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APPENDIX A: OUR SURVEY OF NON-CLAIMANTS
New YouGov survey of unsuccessful claimants
For this report, we conducted a new YouGov survey of unsuccessful claimants, kindly 
funded by the Health Foundation. This survey included two parts:
 ȫ Screening survey: to find probable non-claimants, we asked two screening 
questions to 170,000 participants in YouGov surveys from April-July 2020. These 
asked people (i) if they had claimed benefits during the pandemic; and (ii) if they 
had not tried to claim benefits, why not.
 ȫ Follow-up survey: we conducted a follow-up survey of 5,120 probable non-
claimants in the screening survey, based on five quota groups, of whom 2,763 were 
eligible for the full survey. The survey was conducted 23rd July to 10th August 2020.
The four quota groups in the follow-up survey were:
 ȫ probable non-claimants due to migration status (explicitly flagging this at the 2nd 
screening question) – 325 people started the follow-up survey, of whom 260 were 
eligible for the full survey;
 ȫ probable non-claimants who would have been eligible (who said they might be 
eligible, but don’t think it will be worth the hassle or just don’t want to claim benefits 
– among this group, we focused only on those likely to be struggling financially) 
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– 977 people started the follow-up survey, of whom 720 were eligible for the full 
survey;
 ȫ probable non-claimants who would not have been eligible but are still struggling 
(who said they had too much income/savings to claim – among this group, we 
focused only on those likely to be struggling financially) – 1,077 people started the 
follow-up survey, of whom 828 were eligible for the full survey.
 ȫ probable unsuccessful claimants (who had tried and unsuccessful to claim 
benefits at the 1st screening question, or said that the reason they were not 
claiming benefits was because they had struggled to claim – 2,669 people started 
the follow-up survey, of whom 910 were eligible for the full survey;
 ȫ probable unsuccessful claimants from our claimant survey: we also add a small 
number of people who indicated in the screening survey that they were successful 
claimants, but when followed-up for our survey of claimants indicated that they 
were unsuccessful claimants – 72 people started the follow-up survey, of whom 45 
were eligible for the full survey.
For probable non-claimants who would not have been eligible, we focused on those 
who are likely to be struggling financially (to enable us find a sizeable group of people 
who were eligible for benefits but not taking them up). We defined ‘likely to be 
struggling financially’ as those with current household income of <£30,000/£45,000 
(depending on whether they have children) and who did not say that the reason they 
were not claiming benefits is because they did not need them. Note that people’s 
status in this report is not the same as their original quota allocation. For example, the 
final group of ‘unsuccessful claimants’ is not the same as the quota group of probable 
unsuccessful claimants – the more detailed follow-up survey provides a better 
understanding of people’s current situation (many probable unsuccessful claimants 
said that they had not actually tried to claim, and instead make up one of the groups 
of people not taking-up benefits or who were ineligible).
Data are weighted to account for the proportions of different groups we invited to 
take part in the follow-up survey, and to be representative of the working-age (18-64) 
population.58 The anonymised dataset is publicly available via the UK Data Archive.59
Estimating the share of the population in each group
To estimate the prevalence of e.g. those not taking-up benefits that they were 
entitled to in the general population, we need to combine (i) the share of each quota 
group that did not take-up benefits, with (ii) how common each quota group is in the 
general population. The anonymised dataset therefore includes a screening survey 
that enables the second step, together with some Stata code that enables these 
two proportions to be combined into a single estimate. More precisely: to get at the 
reasons that people had not claimed benefits, we asked the following question:
Which of the following come closest to why you are not currently claiming any 
of these benefits/tax credits? (Please tick all that apply)
<1> My income hasn’t changed during lockdown so I don’t need them
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<2> My income has gone down, but I am still comfortable financially so I don’t 
need them
<3> My income has gone down, but I am still earning too much to claim them
<4> My income has gone down, but I have too much other income/savings to 
claim them
<5> I don’t think I’m eligible due to my immigration status
<6> I don’t think I’m eligible for other reasons
<7> I might be eligible, but have struggled to make a claim
<8> I might be eligible, but I don’t think it will be worth the hassle
<9> I might be eligible, but I don’t want to be the kind of person who claims 
benefits
<10> I might be eligible, but am not claiming for other reasons
<11> Don’t know
The group of “probable non-claimants who would not have been eligible but are still 
struggling” comes from responses <3> and <4> to this question. That is, it excludes 
people who said that their income hadn’t changed in lockdown, or who just didn’t 
need benefits (or who thought they might be eligible but had decided not to claim).
Some people in the screening survey refused to tell us their income, but otherwise 
would have been included in one of the quota groups – and a certain proportion of 
these people would have been in the various groups that we look at in this report. 
To avoid biasing all of our estimates downwards, our main estimates re-weight the 
data to adjust for this non-response.60
YouGov surveys of the general public
We compared the mental health and financial situation of unsuccessful claimants 
to the general population. To do this, we used two surveys: (i) a YouGov survey of 
6,000 working-age people conducted May 6-11th for the Resolution Foundation 
(also funded by the Health Foundation); and (ii) a YouGov survey of 1,600 working-
age people conducted May 21st-June 15th for the Welfare at a (Social) Distance 
project. Many thanks to the Resolution Foundation for making their data available 
for this report.
A general note on YouGov surveys
The surveys all use the YouGov platform – which not only has an established online 
panel that enables rapid data collection during lockdown(s), but is also the largest 
online panel in the UK. It has been extensively used for academic research, including 
during the COVID-19 pandemic (for an early list, see here).
The YouGov panel represents a diverse group of people recruited from a variety of 
sources, at the current time numbering 400,000 (UK) active users – about 0.7% of 
the total UK population. To generate approximately representative samples from this 
non-probability panel, YouGov offer incentives to a sub-sample of the panel to take 
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part, who are designed to be representative of the national adult population (which 
they term ‘active sampling’). Non-response weights are also calculated to ensure 
that the final sample match these known population totals.61 YouGov provides more 
general descriptions of its panels here and via the YouGov ESOMAR statement 
[accessed 11/8/2020].
It is not possible to provide a conventional response rate (as a proportion of the 
YouGov panel members invited to participate), because participants are allocated to 
surveys at the point they log in to the YouGov site, rather than at the point that they 
are invited to participate – something that has been noted by other political scientists 
using YouGov data (e.g. Kootstra, 2016). For the same reason, however, this non-
response is likely to be unrelated to interest in the benefits system – participants will 
not be aware of the topic of the survey in question, which avoids a major contributor 
to non-response bias (Groves et al., 2006). Across different surveys, about 1 in 5 of 
those invited to participate will ultimately do so, on average 19 hours after receiving 
the invitation email.
Note that there are two limitations to the representativeness of our weighted YouGov 
surveys:
 ȫ While being broadly representative of the population, the YouGov panel inevitably 
under-represents those with weaker written English language skills (and therefore 
under-represents first-generation migrants) and who struggle to access the internet 
via a computer/smartphone.
 ȫ Weighting ensures representative results where the weighting variables fully capture 
those factors that influence both participation in the survey and the phenomenon 
under investigation. To the extent that they fail to do this, biases can result.
It is worth noting that even ‘gold standard’ social research surveys – those using 
random samples of the population, with high response rates – must contend with 
threats to representativeness, as non-respondents may differ respondents. Overall, 
our judgement is that for most purposes, weighted YouGov data can be treated as 
broadly representative of the population – but there are particular issues in capturing 
some groups of unsuccessful claimants, as mentioned in the main report.
APPENDIX B: ESTIMATING ENTITLEMENT TO UNIVERSAL CREDIT
The detailed rules setting out eligibility for benefits are complex, and partly as a result, 
it is not easy to estimate eligibility for benefits in a survey. We here estimate eligibility 
for Universal Credit (UC), and in this appendix we explain how the eligibility model 
works in as simple terms as possible.62 Note that we do not estimate eligibility to new-
style JSA/ESA as we do not have sufficient data to check people’s National Insurance 
contributions.
Many thanks are due to the Resolution Foundation for supplying their survey-based 
UC eligibility model,63 which forms the basis for our own model – it would simply 
not have been possible to create this model from scratch for this rapid response 
project, and we are therefore indebted to the Resolution Foundation for enabling this 
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piece of research. We adapted their model using the slightly greater detail available 
in our benefits-focussed survey; we note below where our model differs from the 
Resolution Foundation (‘RF’) model. The model has several components:
 ȫ Individual and partner earnings
 ȫ Alternative income measure
 ȫ Housing costs
 ȫ UC entitlement
 ȫ Accounting for missing data
We explain each part of the model in turn.
Individual and partner earnings
UC eligibility depends on household earnings. We asked respondents for the exact 
amount that they (and their partner) earned last week, what time period this payment 
refers to, and whether these earnings are net or gross. The model then converts 
gross into net earnings.
We amended the RF model by asking follow-up questions to those who were unable 
to give detailed pay data, to ask for their pay within income bands. This substantially 
reduced missingness: of the 832 who did not provide detailed pay (out of the 1,987 
working respondents), 579 were able to provide their pay within a broad band, with 
only 253 being unable to do so. (Similarly for people’s partners, of the 828 who did not 
provide detailed pay out of the 1,422 working partners, 494 were able to provide their 
partner’s pay within a broad band, with only 334 being unable to do so).
For these people, we are obviously uncertain exactly within the pay band their 
pay falls; and a further 87 people (and 65 talking about their partner) were unsure 
whether the figure they gave was gross or net. We therefore estimate two eligibility 
models: a ‘minimum eligibility’ model (which assumes that people’s pay falls at the 
top of these bands, and that reported pay is net if they are unsure) and a ‘maximum 
eligibility’ model (which assumes that people’s pay falls at the bottom of these bands, 
and that reported pay is gross if they are unsure). In the report, affected estimates are 
given as ranges, and 95% confidence intervals range from e.g. the lower bound of the 
minimum eligibility model to the upper bound of the maximum eligibility model.
There are also two more minor ways we amended the RF model. Firstly, where 
people’s partners were paid hourly, we asked people’s partners for their exact hours 
of work (rather than assuming 35 hours/week). Secondly, we allowed an ‘other’ 
(open text) category for the period that earnings covered, which we then coded 
manually.
Alternative income measure
We amended the RF model by checking the estimates of individual and partner 
earnings against a separate question on people’s current gross annual household 
income. We used this broad household income measure instead of the more detailed 
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respondent/partner earnings measures where there was reason to think that the 
latter were incorrect, namely:
 ȫ Where people reported zero pay but said they were furloughed (94 respondents 
talking about themselves, and 13 talking about their partners);
 ȫ Where people reported zero pay but there were good reasons to think they were 
working, including: listing their own work as a current income source and reported 
either working currently in their job or working some hours last week (21 people) /// 
listing work as a current income source and saying they have a new job since the 
pandemic began (2 people) /// not listing own work as a current income source but 
saying that last week they were working in their job (9 people);
 ȫ Where people reported that their partner had zero pay but they seemed to be 
working (either they listed their partner’s work as an income source, or that 
they worked last week – 30 people).
Just as for individual/partner earnings, we assumed income was at the top of 
these bands for our ‘minimum eligibility’ model, and at the bottom of these bands 
for our ‘maximum eligibility’ model. Note that the alternative income measure will 
overestimate relevant income (and underestimate benefit eligibility) where people 
receive other benefits that are disregarded in calculating UC eligibility (e.g. Child 
Benefit or PIP).
We should emphasise that even after making these corrections, there are several 
major limitations to our income data. Firstly, we ask about people’s earnings last week, 
but people’s eligibility for UC will depend on a longer time period. (Given the volatility 
of the early lockdown period, this was a deliberate choice to make it easier for people 
to respond). This relates to a wider point that estimating benefits eligibility is difficult 
in the face of income volatility (which is common among those with low earnings)64 – 
people are not just ‘eligible’ or ‘ineligible’ for fixed periods, but may cycle in and out of 
eligibility. Secondly, it is sometimes not clear what the right definition of someone’s 
‘household’ (or more precisely, their ‘benefit unit’) is, particularly for young people who 
are living with their parents.
Housing costs
UC eligibility depends on housing costs, up to a maximum set by the Local Housing 
Allowance (LHA) rate in that area.65 (These areas are called Broad Rental Market 
Areas or ‘BRMAs’).
We amended the RF model for private renters in two ways. Firstly, we had people’s 
exact rent, so where this was lower than the LHA level we used this (rather than 
using an estimated LHA level). Secondly, we have much more precise LHA rate data, 
as we had detail on the exact area that people lived in (at LSOA level). We therefore 
matched people’s address to the maximum LHA rates in their BRMA. We do not have 
data on the number of bedrooms in people’s houses, so this is imputed based on the 
ages of people’s children.66 Many thanks to Owen Boswarva (Datadaptive – see 
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https://www.datadaptive.com/) who kindly provided the LSOA to BRMA lookups 
free of charge for this project.
(In Scotland and Northern Ireland where we do not have this data, we approximate 
Local Housing Allowance rates using Valuation Office data on the lower quartile of 
rents in that region for properties with that number of bedrooms. This is the same 
approach taken in the calculation of the voluntary Living Wage. These rents are likely 
to be underestimates on average (because these levels are often lower than LHA 
rates), and are subject to a certain degree of error (because the areas that these 
rents are applied to are different in the Valuation Office data than in the calculation of 
LHA).
For social renters, we amended the RF model by simply asking people to tell us their 
rent, and assuming that this was covered in full by UC (as social renters are not 
covered by LHA).
There are two things that we have insufficient detail to include in our mode: (i) 
Government support for owner-occupiers to pay mortgages (known as ‘Support for 
Mortgage Interest’ (SMI)); and (ii) the ‘bedroom tax’ / ‘under-occupancy charge’. The 
former will lead to underestimates of eligibility, the latter will lead to overestimates.
UC entitlement
We estimate people’s initial entitlement to UC (excluding earnings) by adding the 
basic element (which depends on whether they have a partner and their age), the 
child element (which is based on their number of children; see just below), and the 
housing element (as calculated above). We then apply the taper reduction (which 
reduces people’s UC by the taper rate multiplied by people’s earnings above any work 
allowances that apply).
We do not estimate entitlement to childcare support or enhanced allowances due to 
ill-health/disability (due to data limitations). This will underestimate benefit income in 
some cases.
We amended the RF model in multiple ways to improve the accuracy of estimated 
entitlements:
 ȫ We take work allowances into account (which were ignored in the original RF 
model);
 ȫ We take into account the two-child limit (albeit only for 3rd children born from July 
2018 rather than April 2017);
 ȫ We take into account people’s level of savings (UC is reduced by £4.35 for each 
£250 of savings that people have about £6,000; those with savings of £16,000 are 
ineligible for UC. This differs in our two models: in our ‘minimum entitlement’ model 
we use the top of the bands that people reported their savings were in, and assume 
that those who refused to tell us their level of savings were ineligible /// in our 
‘maximum entitlement’ model we use the bottom of the bands that people reported 
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their savings were in, and assume that those who refused to tell us their level of 
savings had less than £6,000 of savings);
 ȫ We take into account if people report having No Recourse to Public Funds (we 
treat as ineligible anyone who says they came on a NRPF visa), or if they say 
they thought they were ineligible because “I can’t establish that I am present and 
habitually resident in the UK”;
 ȫ We updated the parameters of the UC system to match the 2020–21 financial year 
(including pandemic-related adjustments).
Accounting for missing data
We were not able to estimate UC eligibility for all respondents, because a small 
minority of respondents could not provide any estimate of their or their partner’s 
earnings. (This was true of 369 of 2,094 people). If we simply ignored these 
people then our results might be biased, because some types of people may be 
systematically more likely to fail to provide detail on their earnings.
To minimise this effect, we follow the RF model in creating new weights that account 
for differential non-response. We do this by estimating a probit regression model 
that looks at how non-response varies by age, region, gender, pre-pandemic working 
status (of themselves and their partner), number of children, highest qualification and 
tenure. We then scale the initial YouGov weights by the inverse of the probability of 
non-response.
Separately to this, we do not estimate eligibility for 669 people (out of our 2,763 
respondents) who were either students or where they/their partner was retired.67 
We do not reweight the data to account for this as these are people where data are 
not missing, but where instead we lack sufficient detail to estimate eligibility for these 
groups. The numbers of people in the population who are/are not eligible for UC will 
therefore be slightly underestimated.
APPENDIX C: ESTIMATING ENTITLEMENT TO NEW STYLE JSA
Due to limited space, our survey focused primarily on establishing eligibility for UC. 
Nevertheless, we have attempted to crudely estimate entitlement to new style JSA, 
as follows:
Working status
New style JSA is available to people who are currently working less than 16 hours 
per week. However, the situation at the start of COVID-19 is complex – some people 
were technically attached to jobs but not being paid.68 We have conservatively 
focused on those who say that they did not have a job (excluding those who said they 
had a job but had no shifts).
Moreover, because people’s hours in the week before interview were affected by the 
pandemic, it is difficult to check the exact hours that people were usually working. We 
have therefore conservatively excluded those who reported any earnings from work 
at the current time.




The main complexity in estimating entitlement to new style JSA is checking if people 
had made sufficient National Insurance (NI) contributions to be eligible to claim. The 
detailed rules on NI contributions can be found in the DWP’s Advice to Decision 
Makers chapter R1 at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/advice-for-
decision-making-staff-guide (particularly sections R1067 and R1074). In simplified 
form, this requires that people were employees who earnt at least ≈£3,000 in either of 
the last two tax years, and ≈£6,000 across both of the last two completed tax years. 
(Tax years start/end in April, so for this project the relevant tax years are 2018–19 and 
2019–20).
We do not have people’s working history over the past 2½ years, let alone the exact 
amount that they earnt in each year. Instead, we approximate eligibility by assuming 
that anyone recently working as an employee was likely to be eligible for new style 
JSA. Combined with the previous criteria on working status, this means that we 
treat someone as possibly eligible for new style JSA if (i) they were working as an 
employee in February 2020 just before COVID-19; (ii) they say they are no longer 
working in this job; (iii) they say they have not found another job; (iv) they report no 
earnings from work at the present time.
It seems likely that this results in an underestimate of new style JSA eligibility. For 
example, there were 50,000 people not counted in the main estimate who were 
previously working as employees (using YouGov profile data) in the 6 months before 
COVID-19 (that is, since September 2020) who were not currently working, some of 
whom are likely to have been eligible for new style JSA.
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We estimated the probability of having missing income data (within each of these two groups separately) based on age, 
gender, number of children, and education (we experimented with including region, but it had no effect on response). 
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